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DEFINING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN OFFSHORE
AQUACULTURE: SHOULD IT FEATURE
DELEGATION TO THE STATES?
Alison Rieser"
I. INTRODUCTION
Improvements in the science and technology of marine aquaculture,
the growth in multiple use conflicts in nearshore coastal waters, and the
overfished condition of many commercially exploited fish stocks suggest
it may be time to consider using open ocean waters for raising marine
species for food and other uses. As on previous occasions when similar
signs pointed toward aquaculture, policy makers recognize that the legal
framework for government involvement is not well-equipped to respond
to many of the issues that surround sea farming in the offshore environ-
ment.
The purpose of this Article is to describe some of the important
attributes of an effective legal fiamework for open ocean aquaculture and
to discuss the ability of federal agencies to provide these attributes under
current law. Part HI outlines the legal and regulatory barriers to the
development of aquaculture in the United States, and the elements of an
improved government framework for aquaculture are described in Part III.
Next, Part IV discusses the roles of state and federal agencies in the
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aquaculture permit process. Part V reviews the key provisions of
proposed federal legislation for management of aquaculture in the federal
200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and finally, in Part VI, a
proposal is offered for an alternative system of state-based management
with federal oversight and coordination.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES IN AQUACULTURE REGULATION
Commentators have noted the legal and regulatory barriers to
aquaculture development in the United States for at least the past twenty
years.' The constraints generally attributed to legal and institutional
factors include costs in time, expense of applications, and uncertainty, all
of which may discourage entrepreneurs and scare off investors and
banks.2 The National Research Council (NRC) found in 1978, for
example, that the procedures required to obtain permits and licenses "have
been a severe deterrent to aquaculture. 3 The major problems relate to
the lack of uniformity of laws in different states, the difficulty of obtaining
concise lists of the legal requirements within a given state, and the
difficulty in obtaining the many permits and licenses.4
The NRC study also concluded, however, that while some laws and
regulations may reduce aquaculture's economic potential, aquaculture
development "may also be constrained by the absence of laws." 5 It noted
that laws provide many forms of government assistance to terrestrial but
not aquatic farmers in the form of low-interest loans, technical advisory
services, and even commodity price guarantees. 6 Moreover, in the
absence of an effective legal framework, sea farmers lack even the basic
1. For an early commentary on the legal framework for aquaculture in the United
States, see THOMAS E. KANE, UNIvERSITY OF MIAMI, SEA GRANT TECHNICAL BULLETIN
No. 2, AQUACULTURE AND THE LAW (1970); RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF THE GULF OF
MAINE, AQUACULTURE: A NEW ENGLAND PERSPECTIVE (Thomas A. Gaucher ed., 1971).
2. See generally MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT,
AQUACULTURE WHITE PAPER AND STRATEGIC PLAN (1995) [hereinafter AQUACULTURE
WHITE PAPER].
3. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AQUACULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 90 (1978) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
1978].
4. Id. at 76.
5. Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
6. Id.
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security of ownership if they use public waters for all or part of their
operations.7
Aquaculture is heavily affected by public laws because it involves
many things that modem governments are concerned with: food produc-
tion, water supply, the use of navigable waters, and environmental
protection. Thus, agencies become part of the aquaculture legal maze if
they are concerned with food safety, public health, water quality, or land
and water conservation.8 Moreover, concern for these issues occurs at all
three levels of American government: federal, state, and local. What
appears to be redundancy is really a manifestation of the fact that Ameri-
can governmental power is often exercised at three different levels with
each level believing it has a special responsibility or interest to protect.
Some of the ways in which the law may present obstacles to aquacul-
ture include:
(1) the limited availability of property rights or other inter-
ests that can secure a producer's investment;
(2) poorly defined standards that fail to reduce conflicts
among competing users of public resources;
(3) poorly defined agency jurisdictions leading to delays in
defining applicable standards or regulations;
(4) the existence of redundant regulations due to overlapping
agency responsibilities; and
(5) inappropriate restrictions designed to protect wild
stocks. 9
7. BRUCE H. WILDSMrH, AQUACULTJEE: THE LEGALFRAMEWORK 113-14 (1982).
8. NATIONAL RES.ARCH COUNCIL 1978, supra note 3, at 90; See generally, Ronald
J. Rychlak & Ellen M. Peel, Swimming Past the Legal Hook: Navigating Legal Obstacles
in the Aquaculture Industry, 23 ENVTL. L. 837 (1993).
9. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 1978, supra note 3, at 75-80. For a discussion
of some of the legal barriers faced by aquaculture farmers, including the numerous
requirements imposed by federal and state regulations, see generally Tim Eichenberg &
Barbara Vestal, Improving the Legal Framework for Marine Aquaculture: The Role of
Water Quality Laws and the Public Trust Doctrine, 2 TERR. SEA J. 339 (1992); Rychlak
& Peel, supra note 8; Todd R. Burrowes, How Are You Going to Get Them Down to the
Farm? Legal Obstacles to Salmon Farming in Maine, TERR. SEA, Fall/Winter 1988, at 1.
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A. Security of Tenure
The single most significant question one must ask about any legal
framework affecting marine aquaculture is: how secure is the interest that
the sea farmer receives from the government? For the interest to function
as a property interest it should have some or all of the following attrib-
utes: transferability, duration and renewability, and revocability only for
failure to perform specified conditions."0 These conditions, however, are
not present in many existing regulatory systems.
In Massachusetts, for example, where the state and local governments
issue licenses for marine aquaculture instead of leases, court decisions
suggest that when the above features are not present in a license, the kinds
of shellfish licenses issued under current state law do not convey sufficient
interest to create a property right that the holder can defend in court or
use to recover damages.I
On the other hand, when the government seeks to create private
interests in tidal lands or waters through an exclusive lease or license,
special legal principles designed to protect public uses known as public
trust rights can come into play.' 2 These public property interests must be
balanced against the sea farmer's needs for a secure interest in the
cultured species and for protection against damage from other activities.' 3
10. See WILDSMITH, supra note 7, at 137-47.
11. See, e.g., Connerty v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 495 N.E. 2d 840 (Mass. 1986)
(license held by master clam digger did not create a properly right which would allow him
to recover from Metropolitan District Commission for discharge of raw sewage into
harbor).
12. According to the public trust doctrine, the states hold all navigable waters, and
the lands under them, in trust for the common use of the public. Phillips Petroleum v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). Traditionally, courts have protected the public right to
fishing and navigation in public trust waters and lands, and have even expanded the scope
of the public trust to include other uses such as recreation and ecological preservation. Id.
at 476. For further discussion of the public trust doctrine, see generally Joseph L. Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in National Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970); Note, The Public Trust in 7-dal Areas: A Sometime Submerged
Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970): Bernard S. Cohen, The Constitution, the
Public Trust Doctrine and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388; Jan S. Stevens, The
Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental
Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 195 (1980); Alison Rieser, Public Trust, Public Use, and
Just Compensation, 42 ME. L. REv. 5 (1990).
13. See Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 9, at 353.
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Legal differences between the lease and license forms of tenure must
be considered carefully. The lease has certain advantages over a license
in terms of security of tenure.1 4 Even a lease, however, cannot convey to
the sea farmer permanent, exclusive control of an area of the ocean. 15
The public property rights and other principles mentioned above prevent
the conveyance of exclusive private use rights to submerged lands or
waters in perpetuity. States that use the lease form to secure tenure make
the sea farmer's use subject to public and private riparian rights and to
government oversight.' 6 To improve the security of this interest, govern-
ments can provide for criminal sanctions and a civil right of action against
individuals who violate the sea farmer's rights as lessee of the sea bed and
water column. 17 The public rights of navigation and fishing must be
protected in the leasing system, which means the process by which the
government conveys a lease to the sea farmer is also critical to the
security of the interest conveyed.
B. Use Conflicts
Even when the sea farmer's lease or license is backed by criminal
sanctions against persons damaging or interfering with the farm, this alone
cannot ensure peaceful co-existence among all users of the marine
environment.18 It is crucial, therefore, that the government's process for
issuing the lease or license itself protects the sea fanner from conflicts
with other marine uses. The statute authorizing the conveyance of a lease
of public waters or submerged lands for aquaculture should identify other
public and private uses of the marine environment that are potentially
affected by aquaculture activities. It should then provide a fair but
efficient process for information to be brought forward about those uses
in the area proposed for use as a sea farm, allowing the leasing agency to
make a balanced and informed decision in which other users believe they
have been fairly considered. The adverse consequences for the sea farmer
of a licensing process that fails to consider other uses can include serious
14. See discussion infra at V.A.
15. WILDSMrrH, supra note 7, at 107-10.
16. See, e.g., 12 M.R.S.A. § 6072 (1994) (Maine aquaculture leasing statute).
17. WILDSMrTH, supra note 7, at 107-08.
18. See Burrowes, supra note 9, at 3, 7; See also Paul MacNeil, Growers Need
Better Protection, ATLANTIC FISH FARMING, May 1996, at 4; Jeff Ducharme, Fishermen
Fear Aquaculture is 'Musseling' In, ATLANTIc FISH FARMING, Dec. 18, 1995, at 11.
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use conflicts. For example, the failure of town officials to consider
conflicts with riparian owners' use rights in licensing shellfish farms off
Cape Cod led to judicial decisions that may adversely affect sea farming
opportunities in that state.19
The New England Fishery Management Council's recent difficulties
with the approval of an amendment to the Atlantic Scallop Fishery
Management Plan (FMP) to allow an experimental scallop aquaculture
project illustrates the problems that arise if the approval agency is
unfamiliar with the needs of new sea farming operations and is not subject
to deadlines for its decision. It demonstrates also the need for the
authorizing statute to make clear who has the burden of proof to come
forward, and when, on the issue of potential conflicts.1°
The Maine aquaculture leasing law, by contrast, requires a formal
adjudicatory hearing before a lease can be issued.2 While sometimes
time-consuming and contentious, the process does ensure that potentially
conflicting uses are given an opportunity to be heard and their interests
balanced against those of the prospective sea farmer. This gives the
government's issuance of a secure tenure more legitimacy once it is finally
approved. 22
19. See Julia Underwood, Comment, Intertidal Zone Aquaculture and the Public
Trust Doctrine, 2 OcEAN & COAsTAL L.J. 383 (1997) (discussing Pazolt v. Div. of Marine
Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1994)).
20. See generally Clifford Goudey, Open Ocean Culture of Sea Scallops Off New
England, Presentation at the Open Ocean Aquaculture Conference, Portland, Me. (May 8-
10, 1996). The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1801-1882 (1994), amendedby Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat.
3559 (1996) does not expressly authorize the regional fishery management councils or the
National Marine Fisheries Service to license aquaculture projects in the EEZ. See William
J. Brennan, To Be Or Not To Be Involved: Aquaculture Management Options for the New
England Fishery Management Council, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 261 (1997). Federal
regulations under the Sea Scallop FMP were necessary, however, to exempt the eight scallop
vessels participating in the experiment from the days-at-sea effort restrictions designed to
conserve wild sea scallop resources. See NOAA Proposed Rules, Atlantic Sea Scallop
Fishery, Amendment 5, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,428 (1996) (to be codified at 50 CFR § 648.14,
648.56) (proposed Sept. 20, 1996). The scallop aquaculture project was first proposed to
the New England Fishery Management Council in 1994, but not approved until September
1996.
21. 12 M.R.S.A. § 6072(6) (1994). See Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 9, at 360.
22. Interview with William J. Brennan, former Commissioner of the Maine
Department of Marine Resources, in Portland, Me. (Oct. 23, 1995).
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C. Agency Coordination
The question of fragmentation and overlapping agency mandates has
two sides. An apparently redundant regulatory requirement may actually
serve a useful purpose. Sometimes, an overlap in agencies' jurisdiction
can improve the security of the interest the sea farmer obtains when it
signals that an agency with a different constituency has accepted an
aquaculture project both in principle and in reality. The object should be
to provide the sea farmer with the advantages of obtaining the blessing of
multiple agencies without imposing heavy costs in time and money to
obtain them.
Regulatory and reviewing agencies have considerably more latitude
and discretion in coordinating their reviews than is often apparent. A
modest effort to cooperate among state and federal agencies in Maine
involves a single application,13 but still relies on separate reviews and
criteria. Nevertheless, the agreement has been described as a break-
through in administrative agency cooperation.' Much more is possible
in the way of reducing separate permit reviews and procedures, without
compromising agency responsibilities.
A final consideration is whether the legal framework provides a
speedy mechanism for exempting aquaculture from regulations that are
designed to conserve wild fish stocks.Y5 If a government agency has
authority to waive season, size limits, and other measures, what proce-
dures must it follow? These decisions should not have to be made by the
legislature and preferably not on a case-by-case basis. Each time a special
waiver or exemption is necessary, the opportunity for opposition and
political pressure exists.' It would be especially inappropriate if the
waivers had to be approved by a marine fisheries advisory council, as
capture fishermen are likely to oppose ventures they may perceive as
producing competition for limited fishing grounds or seafood markets.
23. Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 9, at 397.
24. MARINE LAW INsTITTuE, IMPROVING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MARINE
AQUACULTURE: THE ROLE OF WATER QuALrrY AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE,
TECHNICAL REPORT FOR THE NORTHEASTERN REGIONAL AQUACULTURE CENTER 44-46
(1992) [hereinafter MARINE LAW INSTITUTE 1].
25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
26. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL DEVELOPMENT OF AN AQUACUL-
TURE POLICY AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 12 (1995) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal
Law Journal).
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This consideration should be weighed very heavily in decisions whether
to encourage the expanded role of the federal regional fishery manage-
ment councils in EEZ aquaculture decisions, notwithstanding the probable
legal jurisdiction of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
to consider proposed sea farms under the Magnuson Act.27
III. ELEMENTS OF AN IMPROVED GOVERNMENT FRAMEWORK
FOR AQUACULTURE
Actions and policies that government can take to address the issues
outlined above are described in a set of recommendations developed by
the Marine Law Institute.' These actions would improve the security of
tenure and the coordination of state and federal regulatory frameworks,
both of which would help the development of an offshore sea farming
sector. The following recommendations are equally relevant to aquacul-
ture policies for state and federal marine waters:
(1) the responsible government agency should identify
marine zones favorable to sea farming and consistent with desired
environmental conditions and potential use conflicts;29
(2) all state and federal permits and leases should share a
common application procedure, siting criteria, site evaluation and
monitoring protocols; 0
(3) aquaculture leases (or licenses) should convey an exclu-
sive property interest in the cultured species as well as in the
right to harvest it from the leased area, as far as it is consistent
with public rights of navigation and fishing, to secure the sea
27. See Memorandum from Jay S. Johnson, NOAA Deputy General Counsel, and
Margaret F. Hayes, NOAA Assistant General Counsel for Fisheries, to James W. Brennan,
NOAA Acting General Counsel 1 (Feb. 7, 1993) (discussing the applicability of federal
laws to aquaculture in the EEZ), in WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, supra note 26, at app. B. See
infra at notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
28. See Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 9 (as adapted from the report which was
prepared by the Marine Law Institute for the National Coastal Resources Institute, see
MARINE LAw INsTrrTuTE I, supra note 24); MARINE LAW INSTITUE, LEGAL METHODS FOR
PROMOTING LOCAL SALMON FARMING OPERATIONS IN DOwN EAST MAINE, REPORT TO
THE NATIONAL COASTAL RESOURCES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (1992)
[hereinafter MARINE LAW INSTITUTE II].
29. Id. at 72-73. See also Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 9, at 403.
30. MARINE LAW INsTrruTE I, supra note 28, at 73. See also Eichenberg & Vestal,
supra note 9, at 399.
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farmer's investment against negligence, theft and vandalism, and
to allow for civil causes of action against persons who interfere
with or damage aquaculture facilities;"
(4) state and federal agencies should adopt memoranda of
understanding on coordinating enforcement, research and techni-
cal assistance; 32
(5) maximum acreage limitations should not apply to con-
tracts, joint ventures, or partnerships between small-scale sea
farmers and larger aquaculture companies so that cooperative
arrangements can be implemented; 33
(6) government agencies should provide priorities in licens-
ing or leasing to fishermen displaced by conservation restrictions
on the capture fisheries as an appropriate non-discriminatory
means of promoting local economic benefits from sea farming; 3
(7) sea farm applicants should be encouraged to enter into
private agreements with local fishermen's organizations, coopera-
tives or community groups for work in the sea farming operation,
to prevent use conflicts and promote local economic benefits and
acceptance of sea farms;35
(8) agency public hearing procedures should balance the
due process rights of sea farm leaseholders with the public right
of participation in decisions affecting public resources, and
should be formal enough to exclude interventions not relevant to
the licensing decision but not so formal thatsmall-scale sea farm
applicants are faced with prohibitive application costs;36
(9) public and private efforts should work to create an
insurance pool to compensate sea farmers for losses due to
product destruction or water impoundment orders to protect
public health;37 and
(10) state and local licensing authorities should adopt license-
by-rule procedures for small-scale and experimental farming,
31. MARINE LAW INSTrUTE II, supra note 28, at 70.
32. Id. at 73.
33. Id. at 69.
34. Id. at 70.
35. Id. at 71.
36. Id. at 72.
37. Id. at74.
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with reduced application requirements and expedited proce-
dures.3"
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL ROLE
IN OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE
In 1992, the National Research Council's (NRC) Marine Board
recommended the federal government take a more active role in assisting
the development of offshore aquaculture to avoid the many conflicts
encountered by sea farms operating in nearshore waters.39 The report
noted that one of the many problems with the move offshore was the lack
of federal regulations governing the EEZ. 4
When American Norwegian Fish Farm, Inc. proposed a large-scale
net-penned salmon farm in a permit application to the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers for a site approximately fifty miles east of Gloucester,
Massachusetts,41 two things became apparent. Federal agencies and others
interested in the marine environment quickly realized that people were in
fact willing to site facilities further offshore.42 The federal legal frame-
work, however, was not prepared for the number of concerns that such
facilities presented. 3 The project consisted of ninety floating salmon
pens, attached in groups of ten to a series of nine barges, each thirty
meters in length, anchored to the continental shelf at a single mooring
point.' The facility was designed to swing with the tides and currents
around the anchor point.4 5 It was estimated that the project would require
38. Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 9, at 399.
39. COMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR MARINE
AQUACULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MARINE
AQUACULTURE: OPPORTUNITIES FOR GROWTH, 169-177 (1992) [hereinafter NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL 1992].
40. Id. at 176. See also ROBERT R. STICKNEY, AQUACULTURE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 313 (1996) (discussing findings made by National
Research Council).
41. See Memorandum from Jay S. Johnson and Margaret F. Hayes to James W.
Brennan, supra note 27.
42. STICKNEY, supra note 40, at 314.
43. Id.
44. Attorney Work Product: Review of Federal Jurisdiction over Fish Farms in the
EEZ, from Army Corps of Engineers, to New England Fishery Management Council
(Dec. 28, 1992) (draft), in BRENNAN, supra note 26, at app. B, 7.
45. Id. at 2.
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exclusive use of an area approximately fifty square nautical miles in the
EEZ.
A committee convened at the time by the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) to consider policy options for EEZ aquaculture
concluded that a simple leasing program without royalty payments was
appropriate given the limited profits that could be expected.47 The OTA
committee also suggested that Congress consider working collaboratively
with the coastal states in developing a program to promote orderly
development in the EEZ, given that some facilities were likely to be sited
in places where federal and state jurisdiction coincide.' s At the same
time, the NRC's Marine Board similarly concluded that the federal
government should create an orderly framework for the development of
EEZ aquaculture and should encourage coastal states to adopt and
implement state aquaculture development and management plans.49
An orderly framework was not created, however, nor was a federal-
state partnership pursued in time to deal with this first major offshore
proposal. What followed, unfortunately, was an after-the-fact effort by
federal agencies to determine their powers and responsibilities, much of
it happening after the Army Corps issued and then withdrew a permit."0
The permit was apparently withdrawn when the Conservation Law
Foundation of New England challenged the Corps' refusal to prepare an
environmental impact statement for a project beyond twelve miles.51
The Department of State raised questions as to the project's effect on
the United States international law of the sea and fisheries policies and
obligations and the ability to regulate such a facility under existing federal
law.5 The NOAA Office of General Counsel concluded that the proposed
farm would constitute "fishing" under the Magnuson Act because it would
46. Id.
47. STICKNEY, supra note 40, at 315.
48. Id.
49. NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNciL 1992, supra note 39, at 176. The NRC Marine
Board also concluded that state aquaculture development and management plans should be
included in state coastal zone plans, and that Congress should encourage this by expressly
designating marine aquaculture as a recognized coastal zone use under the Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994). Id.
50. D. Douglas Hopkins, et al., An Environmental Critique of Governmental
Regulations and Policies for Open Ocean Aquaculture, 2 OcEAN & CoAsTAL L.J. 235, 255
(1997).
51. Id. at 248-255.
52. Army Corps of Engineers Review, supra note 44, at 1.
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involve harvesting fish from the EEZ by U.S. vessels.53 The regional
fishery management councils therefore had the authority to manage
aquaculture in the EEZ and would need to amend existing fishery manage-
ment plans to prevent restrictions on harvesting of cultured species.'
NOAA contended, in fact, that it has a strong statutory basis for the
promotion and regulation of marine aquaculture, supported by a history
of public and private-sector research and development, and is thus the
federal agency "best suited to regulate and oversee aquaculture activities
that affect marine ecosystems. "I
NOAA is not at present the lead or even the major federal agency in
aquaculture regulation. Federal authority centers largely around the Army
Corps' permit decision under the Rivers and Harbors Act, 6 as amended
by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCS),1 and the Corps' "public
interest review."58 This review entails a balancing of all the reasonably
expected benefits and detriments to the public interest, including environ-
mental, economic, aesthetic, navigation, property rights, and international
interests.59 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) asserts regula-
tory authority as well under the Clean Water Act' over discharges from
aquaculture facilities as "concentrated aquatic animal production
facilities." 6' Other federal agencies, including NOAA's National Marine
Fisheries Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service, have an opportunity
to review and comment on any permit proposed for issuance by the Corps
or EPA for impacts on navigation and marine wildlife and habitats. 2
Federal leasing of portions of the seabed beyond state waters for aquacul-
ture is not presently possible under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act.63
53. Memorandum from Jay S. Johnson and Margaret F. Hayes to James W. Brennan,
supra note 27.
54. Id.
55. National Marine Fisheries Serv., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, NOAA's ROLE IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARINE AQUACULTURE 1 (undated) (on file with the Ocean and
Coastal Law Journal).
56. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
57. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(e) (1994).
58. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (1995).
59. Id.
60. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
61. 40 C.F.R. § 122.24(a) (1995).
62. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.4(c), 325.3(d) (1996); 40 C.F.R. § 124.59(b) (1996).
63. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1994).
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States also play a role in the federal permit process. In addition to
state water quality certification of proposed federal discharge permits
required under the Clean Water Act, 64 the Coastal Zone Management
Act makes any federal license or permit for activities affecting any land
or water use or natural resources of the coastal zone subject to state
review for consistency with the enforceable policies of a state's approved
coastal zone management program.' A state can reject a sea farm
applicant's consistency certification if the proposed activity conflicts with
an enforceable law or policy included within the state's approved pro-
gram.6' If the state objects, the permit or license may not be issued,
unless the Secretary of Commerce reverses the decision.68 Few states at
present have enforceable laws and policies for aquaculture within their
approved management programs necessary to take full advantage of this
process. Massachusetts, however, sees the federal consistency require-
ment as an opportunity to increase its ability to encourage the develop-
ment of marine aquaculture and to increase the efficiency of the regulatory
process. 69 In its recent Strategic Plan for aquaculture, the Commonwealth
notes that it plans to assert consistency review over offshore aquaculture
proposals 70
While the process for obtaining an individual permit from the
principal federal agencies is lengthy and its outcome uncertain, both the
Corps and the EPA have the authority to issue a general permit under
their respective regulatory authorities.7 ' The general permit is a mecha
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994). See 40 C.F.R. § 123 (1995); Rychlak & Peel,
supra note 8, at 853.
65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1994). State consistency review would thus apply
to federal discharge or navigation permits proposed for sea farms in the EEZ as well as in
state waters if the proposed sea farm activities would affect land or water uses or natural
resources located inside the state's coastal zone, including the state's marine waters. 16
U.S.C. § 1453(1)(1994) (definition of "coastal zone").
67. The applicant must certify to the licensing or permitting agency that the proposed
activity complies with these policies and will be conducted in a manner consistent with the
program. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A).
68. Id. See also NOAA Consistency Regulations, 15 C.F.R. pt. 930 (1995).
69. AQUACULTURE WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 19-20.
70. Id. at 20.
71. The Corps has the authority to issue three distinct forms of general permits:
regional, nationwide, and programmatic. 33 C.F.R. § 325.5(c) (1995). Regional permits
are issued pursuant to 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(c)(2) (1995), and nationwide permits are issued
under 33 C.F.R. § 330.1 (1995).
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nism for granting authority to a class of regulated activities that eliminates
the need for an individual permit, provided the activities are below
specified size or degree of impact thresholds.7" Both the EPA and the
Corps could in theory issue a general permit for ocean aquaculture
facilities that employ common culture methods, design features, and other
factors, and subject them to standard permit conditions and monitoring
protocols. The Corps uses a State Programmatic General Permit' for
approving small-scale sea farms in Massachusetts, in essence "piggy-
backing" on state permit approvals. Additionally, the State of Massachu-
setts has plans to increase the coverage of the general permit to allow even
further regulatory efficiencies.74
The EPA has yet to issue a general permit for marine aquaculture.
It has used the mechanism in the past for marine activities, issuing in the
1980s a general permit to all offshore exploratory drilling rigs, after the
EPA finally accepted that its regulatory authority under the Clean Water
Under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
program, the EPA is authorized to issue general permits in accordance with 40 C.F.R. §
122.28 (1995).
72. Army Corps regulations define "general permit" as follows:
(f) The term "general permit" means a DA [(Department of the Army)]
authorization that is issued on a nationwide or regional basis for a category or
categories of activities when:
(1) Those activities are substantially similar in nature and cause only
minimal individual and cumulative environmental impacts; or
(2) The general permit would result in avoiding unnecessary duplica-
tion of the regulatory control exercised by another Federal, state, or
local agency provided it has been determined that the environmental
consequences of the action are individually and cumulatively minimal.
33 C.F.R. § 322.2 (f) (1995).
73. See Proposed Regulatory Guidance Letter on Programmatic General Permits, 61
Fed. Reg. 18,575 (1996) (discussing programmatic general permits).
[A Programmatic General Permit (PGP)] is a type of general permit, issued by
the Corps, that authorizes, for the purposes of Section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, and/or Section 103
of the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, certain
projects that are also regulated by another Federal, tribal, state, or local
regulatory authority [(or other regulatory authority (ORA))]. A PGP is the
written vehicle identifying the terms, limitations, and conditions under which
specific projects regulated by an ORA program may be authorized under the
Corps Regulatory Program with a much more efficient and abbreviated review
by the Corps.
Id.
74. AQUACULTURE WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 197.
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Act applied.75 The case of ocean aquaculture is different from the OCS
drilling permit, however, because the EPA was faced with hundreds of
existing discharges from drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico and
elsewhere. Open ocean aquaculture operations are only in the planning
stages.76 The EPA does not face the same permit burden and thus does
not have the same incentive for adopting a general permit to facilitate EEZ
aquaculture. While the Corps and other agencies are under some pressure
to reduce regulatory burdens and to streamline their operations,' it is not
clear whether they are willing to reduce their authority in deference to
another federal agency, such as the National Marine Fisheries Service or
the Regional Fishery Management Councils, on this particular class of
activities.
In fact, jurisdiction over aquaculture seems to be a sore point with
some federal agencies at present. The memoranda on agencies' jurisdic-
tion written at the time of the American Norwegian Fish Farm, Inc.
project,7 8 as well as the more publicized debates over the Department of
Agriculture versus the Department of Commerce as the appropriate lead
federal agency,79 suggest that a "turf battle" among agencies may be well
underway. While not unusual in environmental and natural resources
policy, these battles strain resources and tend to work against the public
interest in the long run. This leads to the question of what the above
considerations and recommendations suggest when considering the need
for new federal legislation for offshore aquaculture.
75. See Final General NPDES Permits for Oil and Gas Operations on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) and in State Waters of Alaska; Bering Sea and Beaufort Sea, 49
Fed. Reg. 23,734 (1984); Brennan, supra note 26, at 5.
76. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 1992, supra note 39, at 135-140.
77. For example, the general regulatory policies of the Army Corps state that "[t]he
general permit program... is the primary method of eliminating unnecessary federal
control over activities which do not justify individual control or which are adequately
regulated by another agency." 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(3) (1995).
78. BRENNAN, supra note 26, at apps. A,B,C, I.
79. See STICKNEY, supra note 40, at 228. See also Doug Thompson, Bill Casts Fish
Farmers Under USDA, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAMZTIE, Jul. 4, 1994, at ID (discussing federal
legislation proposed by U.S. Rep. Blanche Lambert, D-Ark., that would make the USDA
the lead agency for fish farming); Robert M. Sperber, Aquaculture's Growing Pains, Food
Processing, Aug. 1992, at 49 (discussing federal bill introduced by U.S. Rep. Richard H.
Stallings, D-Id., that would designate USDA as lead agency for aquaculture, in effort to
integrate "disparate aquaculture regulations" presently enforced under various agencies).
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V. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON EEZ AQUACULTURE
Many of the above issues are reflected but not effectively resolved in
the Senate bill, S. 1192, introduced as the Marine Aquaculture Act of
1995 on behalf of NOAA in 1995 by Senators Kerry, Pell and Inouye.'
For example, the Congressional findings state that the reason private
industry has not invested in and developed marine aquaculture facilities
within the U.S. is in part because "our marine waters are not susceptible
to private ownership and because our marine waters also support other
public trust uses, including navigation, fishing, recreation, and national
defense."81 Because marine aquaculture presents "several environmental
challenges requiring specialized scientific research and regulatory
programs, "I the bill finds that "incorporating environmental concerns in
the development of marine aquaculture will enhance the prospects of an
economically and environmentally sustainable industry."'
The bill would declare it a federal policy "to ensure that the place-
ment of any new marine aquaculture facility within a state coastal zone,
the territorial sea, or the United States exclusive economic zone, is
economically and environmentally sound and does not pose unreasonable
constraints on other public trust uses of marine waters, such as navigation,
fishing, recreation, and national defense."' The following discussion
considers the bill in light of the three major considerations identified in
Part II above: security of tenure, agency coordination, and use conflicts.'
A. Security of Tenure
The proposed marine aquaculture act would create a new federal
permit requirement for offshore sea farms. It prohibits anyone from
owning, constructing, or operating an offshore marine aquaculture facility
80. Marine Aquaculture Act of 1995, S. 1192, 104th Cong. (1995). The bill was
referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 141 CONG.
R . S12370, S12392 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1995), but not acted on. Another bill, S. 678,
introduced by Senator Akaka of Hawaii, was referred to the Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, with twenty-nine co-sponsors, 141 CONG. REC.
S5217, S5219 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995), but not acted on by that committee either.
81. S. 1192, 104th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (1995).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 2(a)(7).
84. Id. § 2(b)(3).
85. See discussion supra Parts H. A-C.
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except under a permit issued by the Secretary of Commerce. 6 The
Secretary is authorized to issue permits allowing the ownership, construe-
tion or operation of an offshore marine aquaculture facility for up to ten
years, renewable upon expiration. s7 The section makes it clear that once
the facility obtains a permit, the physical structure, the organisms stocked
within it, and any business interests in the offshore facility can be pri-
vately owned by the permittee, but the area of ocean used remains in
public ownership, with only a revocable use permit being granted. 8 The
permits may be revoked for substantial violations of either the permit
conditions or the Secretary's regulations. 9 The permits can be trans-
ferred, and permit fees are limited to the costs of administering the permit
program.'
The bill defines "offshore marine aquaculture facility" as any facility
which is located in whole or in part in the U.S. EEZ, the purpose of
which is to raise, breed, grow, or hold in a living state any marine or
estuarine organism.91 It states that any vessel or other floating craft used
in an offshore facility or that discharges any material into an offshore
facility is not a vessel for the purposes of the Clean Water Act; any
discharge of material directly into the waters of the facility or from the
facility into the surrounding waters shall be considered a point source
under the CWA.Y The intent is to remove any uncertainty and make clear
that these facilities and the vessels involved with them are covered by the
federal general discharge permit program if they involve a discharge of
a pollutant, including presumably discharges of food pellets and antibiot-
ics.
A question remains as to whether the proposed permit offers sufficient
security of tenure for the sea farmer. The permit is transferable, renew-
able, and revocable only for cause and thus provides some of the mini-
mum features. A sea fanner, however, needs an interest that can be
defended against damage or interference;93 a revocable permit or license
86. S. 1192, 104th Cong. § 6(a).
87. Id. § 6(b)(1)-(2).
88. Id. § 6(b)(3).
89. Id. § 6(f)(1).
90. Id. § 6(g)-(b).
91. Id. § 3(2).
92. Id. §3(2)03).
93. See, e.g., MacNeil supra note 18, at 4 (discussing need for exclusive use rights
in order to protect aquaculture facilities from damage and interference).
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:209
at best conveys only a usufructory interest. 9 A usufruct is from Roman
and civil law and is the right of using and enjoying all the advantages and
profits of the property of another without altering or damaging the
substance. 5 The alternative to a permit is a lease, the mechanism used in
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act96 to convey to private companies
rights to explore for and develop oil and gas resources from the seabed,
and by the State of Maine for aquaculture in state waters. 7 Leases can be
structured to allow cancellation upon violation of conditions designed to
protect public uses and values. While issuing a permit rather than a lease
allows the agency to use the informal notice-and-comment process, a
permit is not likely to provide a legal basis for a sea farmer to bring an
action in federal court for interference.9" The choice of a permit over a
lease may have more to do with the public relations of aquaculture than
with administrative convenience. Leases are better for the sea farmer, but
they may be viewed with more suspicion by those who engage in tradi-
tional fisheries and feel threatened by new marine resource activities in
the ocean.99 If a permit is to be used, the bill should support the sea
farmer's interest through federal prohibitions and sanctions against
interference. 10
B. Agency Coordination
Before the Secretary of Commerce may issue the permit under the
proposed bill, many other agencies have an opportunity to add conditions
to it. The Coast Guard, the EPA, the Secretary of the Interior, the
appropriate regional fishery management council, the Defense Depart-
ment, and the Governor of each state adjacent to the proposed facility's
site (or which would be ecologically affected by permit activities), whose
94. See Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 9, at 353-54.
95. A. DAN TAR.LocK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3.02 [1] (1996).
96. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1994).
97. 12 M.R.S.A. § 6072 (1994). See Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 9, at 360.
98. See supra note I I and accompanying text. See also WILDSMITH, supra note 7,
at 117 n.71 (illustrating the insufficient proprietary interest of a license for purposes of
maintaining a claim for wrongful interference).
99. See, e.g., Ducharme, supra note 18, at 11.
100. At least one of the bills considered by the 104th Congress to reauthorize the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act would have provided criminal
sanctions for the interference with marine aquaculture in the EEZ. H.R. 1465, 104th
Cong. (1995).
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state has an approved coastal zone management program, must have at
least 90 days to review the application.10' Each of these officials must
certify that the activities to be permitted would comply with the laws they
administer." If they cannot so certify the Secretary must attach condi-
tions to the permit which the agency or Governor submits would ensure
compliance." ° This review process allows agencies like the Corps and the
EPA to attach conditions for compliance with the Rivers and Harbors Act
and the Clean Water Act. The bill, however, does not exempt sea farms
in the EEZ from the requirement to obtain separate permits under these
two acts.
The Secretary's criteria for issuing the permit include a determination
that the activities would comply with environmental standards.'0' The
Secretary is given two years to develop standards,0" and must address a
host of considerations, including genetic mixing of cultured and wild
stocks, the introduction of non-indigenous species, transmission of
diseases, federal water quality standards, ecologically sound predation
control measures, and other measures to protect the marine environ-
ment. 106 The Secretary is required to conduct a pilot project and use
information from it to revise these environmental standards if significant
new information is obtained on the environmental impacts. 0 7
Given that the Corps and EPA also have responsibility for these
environmental considerations, the bill appears to create a redundant role
for NOAA as representative of the Secretary of Commerce, unless the
intent is to eliminate the need for the permits under the EPA and Corps.
That intent, however, is not apparent in the text of the bill. 08 While a
process for interagency consultation is provided, the bill can be faulted for
failing to go further in streamlining the federal regulatory requirements.
The permit a sea farmer must obtain under section 6, even though it is
reviewed and conditioned by other agencies, does not eliminate the need
for a permit under either the Rivers and Harbors Act or the Clean Water
101. S. 1192, 104th Cong. § 6(e)(1)-(2) (1995).
102. Id. § 6(e)(2).
103. Id. § 6(e)(3)(B).
104. Id. § 6(c)(2)(A).
105. Id. § 6(k)(1).
106. Id. § 6(k)(1)(A)-(F).
107. Id. § 6(k)(3).
108. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
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Act, nor provide an exemption from potentially applicable fisheries
regulations issued by the Magnuson Act's regional management councils.
In Section 7 on Model Environmental Guidelines," 9 the bill's drafters
apparently intended to influence environmental regulation by the states
through guidelines established by the Secretary. The Section fails,
however, to take advantage of the ability of states to coordinate regulatory
oversight of marine and coastal activities. Some states have become quite
effective in this regard,110 probably due in large measure to the federal
funding of coastal management programs. Section 7 requires the Secre-
tary of Commerce to prepare model guidelines in consultation with other
appropriate federal and state agencies for aquaculture facilities located
within State waters.'1  The guidelines are to include "best management
practices" to minimize the potential damage to the marine ecosystem," 2
minimize "visual pollution" and other interference with public trust uses
of the ocean," 3 and ensure that predation control efforts for cultivated
stocks are ecologically sound."4 The Secretary is directed to develop a
program to encourage voluntary compliance with the guidelines by the
marine aquaculture industry." 5 After development, the Secretary is to
submit the guidelines to the state coastal zone management agencies and
other federal and state agencies involved in either marine aquaculture or
other coastal and marine resources for possible incorporation into state
aquaculture programs or permitting processes. " 6
Section 7 aims to improve state regulatory decisions through recom-
mended standards and guidelines. No incentive, however, is provided for
states to adopt such measures, although the ability to offer a streamlined
regulatory process, focused on state reviews that adhere to certain federal
standards and guidelines, could be a powerful one and a very attractive
prospect for potential sea farmers. Sea farms necessarily require an
109. Under Section 7 it is provided that the Secretary shall "develop and establish
model environmental guidelines with respect to marine aquaculture facilities located within
state waters." S. 1192, 104th Cong. § (7)(a)(1) (1995).
110. See Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 9, at 396 (discussing the State of Maine's
1992 draft guidelines for the establishment of a joint permitting procedure to consolidate
state and federal regulation of fimfish aquaculture projects).
111. S. 1192, 104th Cong. § 7(a)(1) (1995).
112. Id. § 7(a)(4).
113. Id. § 7(a)(4)(D).
114. Id. § 7(a)(4)(E).
115. Id. § 7(a)(5).
116. Id. § 7(b).
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offshore staging area or base of operations to support the offshore farming
activities. It seems to make sense for the state in which this base is
located and which is adjacent to the offshore waters used by the farm, to
exercise oversight of the sea farm's offshore activities, following certain
federal guidelines and minimum standards.117
C. Use Conflicts
In an effort to prevent use conflicts the proposed bill relies on criteria
for the federal permit that the project will not significantly interfere with
"other" public trust uses of the ocean,118 nor interfere with facilities
previously permitted; 119 and that the permittee will remove or properly
dispose of the facility if the permit is revoked or surrendered1 ° and has
posted a bond or other assurances to pay for all costs associated with the
facility's removal.12 To determine if the potential for use conflicts exists,
the bill relies on the standard notice-and-comment process and review by
other agencies." The bill, however, does not take advantage of the many
new regional, consultative and oversight procedures used in federal
marine sanctuaries and under state and provincial marine resources
laws. 1 3 These regional committees and advisory councils get competing
117. See discussion infra in Part VI.
118. S. 1192, 104th Cong. § 6(c)(2)(A) (1995). Section 6 provides that "other
public trust uses" include "recreational and commercial fishing, navigation, conservation,
and aesthetic enjoyment." Id.
119. Id. § 6(c)(2)(B).
120. Id. § 6(c)(2)(C).
121. Id. § 6(c)(3).
122. Id. § 6(d)-Ce).
123. See, e.g., National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1445a (1994)
(allowing Secretary of Commerce to establish Advisory Councils-consisting of
representatives from local user groups, public interest organizations, educational
organizations, scientific organizations, and other interested groups-to provide assistance
to the Secretary regarding the designation and management of national marine sanctuaries);
National Marine Sanctuary Regulations, 15 C.F.R. 922.23 (1995); Marine Mammal
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1387(f)(6)(A) (1994) (allowing Secretary of Commerce to
establish Take Reduction Teams--consisting of a wide variety of governmental, non-
governmental, and user group representatives-to draft take reduction plans that will assist
in the recovery or prevent depletion of specified marine mammal stocks); 61 Fed. Reg.
5384 (1996) (establishing Take Reduction Team for the Gulf of Maine harbor
porpoise/sink-gillnet fishery); 61 Fed. Reg. 40, 819 (1996) (establishing Take Reduction
Team to address bycatch of northern right whales and humpback whales in several Atlantic
fisheries); Shira Golden, Nova Scotia Aquaculture Initiative Raises Sustainability
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users involved early in the process and would give sea farmers a greater
chance to address potential opposition and resistance from other uses and
interests. In Nova Scotia, for example, regional aquaculture boards are
charged with bringing together many points of view and stakeholders to
facilitate the often controversial siting process."2' The proposed Senate
bill allows for the creation of marine aquaculture advisory and review
panels, but it uses them only in assisting with the administration of the
research and development grant program that the bill would create."Z
Furthermore, the bill creates some ambiguity with respect to the
position of aquaculture vis-A-vis other uses of the marine environment.
It refers to interference with "other" public trust uses that must be
avoided, 26 suggesting that aquaculture is among these public use rights.
If this is the intent, then this status may be contrary to some state law.
For example, in Pazolt v. Division of Marine Fisheries the Massachu-
setts Law Court decided that aquaculture is not fishing and is therefore not
one of the protected public trust rights."2 The proposed bill fails to
mention whether priority is to be given to existing uses regardless of their
nature or impact on the ocean, and fails to provide a standard by which
to judge claims of potentially significant interference.
Finally, what is most interesting about the bill is that it conveys no
sense of the current attitude in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere concern-
ing federal regulation. The reduction in federal involvement is already
apparent in the marine resources field with the 1996 announcement by
NOAA that it was withdrawing several fishery management plans for
Questions, ALTERNATIVES, Nov. 1993, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII
file (discussing use of public hearings, under Nova Scotia's Aquaculture Act, in process
of site approval for proposed aquaculture facilities); The Canadian Salmon Aquaculture
Industry, MARINE FISHERIES REv., Mar. 1990, at 31, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ASAPII file (discussing cooperation among the provincial government, the salmon farming
industry, academic community, and private sector under the New Brunswick Aquaculture
Act).
124. See Golden, supra note 123, at 7.
125. S. 1192, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995). The bill also provides that the Secretary
"may utilize" any Marine Aquaculture Advisory and Review Panel to assist in the
development of model environment guidelines under Section 7. Id. § 7(a)(2).
126. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
127. 631 N.E. 2d 547 (Mass. 1994). See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
128. Id. at 551 ("'[A]quaculture is not fishing, nor can it legitimately be considered
a 'natural derivative' of the rights to fish .. ").
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fisheries it believes can be better managed by states or interstate commis-
sions. 129
In view of these criticisms of the bill, the following discussion offers
an alternative model for regulating open ocean aquaculture.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR STATE-BASED, REGIONAL MANAGEMENT
OF AQUACULTURE IN THE EEZ
An alternative to the Senate bill's approach would essentially reverse
the roles of federal and state agencies, giving federal agencies a consis-
tency review to prevent navigational conflicts and possible national
security problems in permits or leases issued by a coastal state. Instead
of NOAA issuing the permit and receiving consistency certifications or
proposed conditions from other federal agencies, a state with a federally-
approved aquaculture management program would do so. The idea is to
delegate federal oversight and regulation of offshore aquaculture facilities
to the adjacent coastal state, if that state has adopted a comprehensive
program for the management and oversight of marine aquaculture.
Each federal agency that presently asserts regulatory jurisdiction has
some capacity to delegate its power to a state agency, either through
express provisions like the Clean Water Act's section 402(b)3 ° (although
limited to navigable waters within the state's jurisdiction) or through
administrative measures such as the Corps' state programmatic general
permit.131 The full delegation may require amendments to the federal laws
to make clear under what conditions federal delegation would be accept-
able. Absent such amendments, the details of the delegation could be
worked out by interagency agreement among the Army Corps, EPA, the
Coast Guard, and NOAA, on the coordination and delegation of their
responsibilities to the state.
Generally, in the past, these voluntary delegations of federal responsi-
bility have been difficult to carry out. For example, states have not had
129. NOAA withdrew plans for fisheries including the American lobster, spiny
lobster, and high seas Pacific salmon. See 61 Fed. Reg. 13,478 (1996) (withdrawal of
Fishery Management Plan for American Lobster Fishery); 61 Fed. Reg. 13,149 (1996)
(withdrawal of Fishery Management Plan for the Salmon Fisheries in the EEZ off the coast
of Alaska); 61 Fed. Reg. 12,055 (1996) (withdrawal of Fishery Management Plan for
Spiny Lobster Fishery of the Gulf of Mexico).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994); See also Rychlak & Peel, supra note 8, at 852-56
(discussing delegations of authority to states under the NPDES program).
131. See discussion supra at notes 71-73.
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much success in achieving a return of management responsibility for
marine mammals under Section 109 of the Marine Mammal Protection
Act, 132 and it remains to be seen if states cooperate sufficiently in the
interstate fisheries management process envisioned in the federal FMP
withdrawal. 3 3 What may be more feasible in the aquaculture context is
a partnership for management, much like the more recent national marine
sanctuary programs that involve both federal and state waters, e.g., the
Florida Keys and Monterey Bay.13 4
A memorandum of understanding or interagency agreement could be
the vehicle for coordinating these federal delegations. The memorandum
could include guidelines for state programs that are very general rather
than include a level of detail like that under the Clean Water Act's Section
4021 s or the Marine Mammal Protection Act's Section 109 delegations, 136
but with sufficient detail to ensure that the states will meet the public trust
obligations and protect other uses. The state program for managing
offshore aquaculture could be reviewed by the agencies before operating
in the EEZ. This could occur through the submission of an amendment
to the state's approved coastal zone management program. 137 Funds are
now available under the 1996 reauthorization of the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act for states to develop strategic plans for marine aquaculture. 3
These funds could be used to develop a state-based EEZ management
framework as well as one for state waters.
Furthermore, the development of these program changes could be
guided by new criteria agreed upon by the three delegating agencies and
published by NOAA. The criteria could include many of the items
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (1994). Section 1379 (b), states that "the Secretary shall
transfer management authority for a species of marine mammal to a State if the Secretary
finds, after notice and opportunity for public comment, that the State has developed and
will implement a program for the conservation and management of the species," provided
that the state program conforms with several specified criteria. Id. § 1379(b)(1). See
NOAA, Transfer of Marine Mammal Authority to States, 50 C.F.R. pt. 403 (1995).
133. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Suman, The Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary: An
Innovative Federal/State Partnership in Marine Resource Management, in COASTAL
MANAGEMENT (forthcoming 1997).
135. See supra note 130.
136. See supra note 132.
137. See NOAA Coastal Management Program Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 923.80
(1995).
138. Coastal Zone Protection Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-150, § 7(2), 110 Stat.
1380, 1381 (1996).
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identified in the Senate bill's Section 7, on Model Environmental Guide-
lines. ' The difference would be that once the state program for offshore
aquaculture is reviewed and approved, the other federal agencies would
waive their ability to review individual applications, or would have a very
limited time to come forward with very specific concerns. The federal
responsibilities to protect public rights and environmental quality would
be carried out by the state under the approved program. Once the
Secretary approves the state's program change, the state could then use
the federal consistency provision to ensure federal agencies abide by the
coordinated regulatory process contained in the program.
Any serious proposal for delegating offshore regulatory jurisdiction
to coastal states must consider where to draw the boundaries between the
states, particularly in New England where several states have coastlines
that front the same offshore waters. While a full treatment of this question
is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that the issue of
establishing lateral seaward boundaries is not new in the history of U.S.
coastal management. The 1976 amendments to the federal Coastal Zone
Management Act 4 included provisions designed to increase the incentives
of states to accept new exploratory and development offshore drilling for
oil and gas. Part of the legislation created a coastal energy impact fund
and grant program that was to be allocated to the states based in part on
the amount of outer continental shelf acreage adjacent to the state.14
Adjacency was defined as lying on the state's side of the "extended lateral
seaward boundaries" of the state; 42 such boundaries to be based on
agreement in existing or new interstate compacts, judicial decisions, or by
application of the boundary delimitation principles of the 1958 Law of the
Sea Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.14 3
The above discussion is merely an outline of a possible approach.
Further thought must be given to the proposed framework. It is clear,
139. S. 1192, 104th Cong. § 7(a)(4)(A)-(E) (1995).
140. Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013 (1976).
141. Id. sec. 7, § 308(b)(2)(A), 90 Stat. at 1020.
142. Id. sec. 7, § 308(b)(3)(B), 90 Stat. at 1021. See also Deepwater Port Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1502(1) (1994) (defining "adjacent coastal State" as any coastal state which
"would be directly connected by pipeline to a deepwater port" or which "would be located
within 15 miles of any such proposed deepwater port" for purposes of state review of
deepwater port licenses).
143. Law of the Sea: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 206. See Pub. L. No. 94-370, see. 7, §
308(b)(3)(B)(i)-(ii), 90 Stat. at 1021.
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however, that much of the enthusiasm and opportunity for developing an
effective framework is at the state level, as state and local governments,
fishermen, and conservation groups look for ways to redirect marine
resource development activities away from overfished species and provide
an environmentally sound and sustainable source of seafood and coastal
community economic benefits.'14
144. Alison Rieser, Reconciling the Regulatory Maze for Aquaculture in Boston
Harbor, in NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM, AQUATIC FORUM SERIES, BOSTON HARBOR
AQUACULTURE: BOOM OR BUST? 49, 55 (Sebastian Belle et al. eds., 1996).
